Seemingly altruistic behavior and strategic ignorance in a dictator game with potential loss
Previous studies have indicated that in the standard binary version of the dictator game, people are less likely to behave altruistically when given the opportunity to be strategically ignorant. The present study aims to assess the robustness of individuals’ strategic ignorance in the context of the...
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Frontiers Media S.A.
2025-01-01
|
| Series: | Frontiers in Psychology |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1473500/full |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1846091463735115776 |
|---|---|
| author | Keisuke Yamamoto Hirofumi Hashimoto |
| author_facet | Keisuke Yamamoto Hirofumi Hashimoto |
| author_sort | Keisuke Yamamoto |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Previous studies have indicated that in the standard binary version of the dictator game, people are less likely to behave altruistically when given the opportunity to be strategically ignorant. The present study aims to assess the robustness of individuals’ strategic ignorance in the context of the emergence of empathic concern. It is reasonable to hypothesize that traditional standard dictator games may not be an optimal context for the emergence of empathic concern. Accordingly, the purpose of the present study is to use a dictator game with loss potential that facilitates player empathic concern to investigate the emergence of (seemingly) altruistic behavior and strategic ignorance in the context of empathy. The results of a web experiment with 200 Japanese adults showed that our manipulation of loss had no effect on the occurrence of altruistic behavior and strategic ignorance. Moreover, even in situations in which the participant, as a dictator, is aware that the recipient has suffered a loss, they behave as if they have a legitimate reason not to act altruistically by being strategically ignorant. This result demonstrates the robustness of strategic ignorance and indicates that evoking empathic concern may not have enough of an effect to influence altruistic behavior in the laboratory experiment. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-ccb95ecf3a0f47bdaded7b496f515147 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1664-1078 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2025-01-01 |
| publisher | Frontiers Media S.A. |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Frontiers in Psychology |
| spelling | doaj-art-ccb95ecf3a0f47bdaded7b496f5151472025-01-10T06:10:48ZengFrontiers Media S.A.Frontiers in Psychology1664-10782025-01-011510.3389/fpsyg.2024.14735001473500Seemingly altruistic behavior and strategic ignorance in a dictator game with potential lossKeisuke Yamamoto0Hirofumi Hashimoto1Department of Social Relations, Faculty of Social Relations, Kyoto Bunkyo University, Uji, JapanGraduate School of Literature and Human Sciences, Osaka Metropolitan University, Osaka, JapanPrevious studies have indicated that in the standard binary version of the dictator game, people are less likely to behave altruistically when given the opportunity to be strategically ignorant. The present study aims to assess the robustness of individuals’ strategic ignorance in the context of the emergence of empathic concern. It is reasonable to hypothesize that traditional standard dictator games may not be an optimal context for the emergence of empathic concern. Accordingly, the purpose of the present study is to use a dictator game with loss potential that facilitates player empathic concern to investigate the emergence of (seemingly) altruistic behavior and strategic ignorance in the context of empathy. The results of a web experiment with 200 Japanese adults showed that our manipulation of loss had no effect on the occurrence of altruistic behavior and strategic ignorance. Moreover, even in situations in which the participant, as a dictator, is aware that the recipient has suffered a loss, they behave as if they have a legitimate reason not to act altruistically by being strategically ignorant. This result demonstrates the robustness of strategic ignorance and indicates that evoking empathic concern may not have enough of an effect to influence altruistic behavior in the laboratory experiment.https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1473500/fulldictator gamestrategic ignoranceempathy-altruism hypothesisempathic concernpotential loss |
| spellingShingle | Keisuke Yamamoto Hirofumi Hashimoto Seemingly altruistic behavior and strategic ignorance in a dictator game with potential loss Frontiers in Psychology dictator game strategic ignorance empathy-altruism hypothesis empathic concern potential loss |
| title | Seemingly altruistic behavior and strategic ignorance in a dictator game with potential loss |
| title_full | Seemingly altruistic behavior and strategic ignorance in a dictator game with potential loss |
| title_fullStr | Seemingly altruistic behavior and strategic ignorance in a dictator game with potential loss |
| title_full_unstemmed | Seemingly altruistic behavior and strategic ignorance in a dictator game with potential loss |
| title_short | Seemingly altruistic behavior and strategic ignorance in a dictator game with potential loss |
| title_sort | seemingly altruistic behavior and strategic ignorance in a dictator game with potential loss |
| topic | dictator game strategic ignorance empathy-altruism hypothesis empathic concern potential loss |
| url | https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1473500/full |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT keisukeyamamoto seeminglyaltruisticbehaviorandstrategicignoranceinadictatorgamewithpotentialloss AT hirofumihashimoto seeminglyaltruisticbehaviorandstrategicignoranceinadictatorgamewithpotentialloss |