Seemingly altruistic behavior and strategic ignorance in a dictator game with potential loss

Previous studies have indicated that in the standard binary version of the dictator game, people are less likely to behave altruistically when given the opportunity to be strategically ignorant. The present study aims to assess the robustness of individuals’ strategic ignorance in the context of the...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Keisuke Yamamoto, Hirofumi Hashimoto
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Frontiers Media S.A. 2025-01-01
Series:Frontiers in Psychology
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1473500/full
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