Mechanism design for crowd sensing with data reuse based on two-sided auction
Crowd sensing is a promising sensing paradigm,which mainly uses a variety of embedded sensors in a large number of mobile devices to accomplish data sensing tasks.One of the key issues in crowd sensing is how to effectively coordinate mobile device users to perform multiple sensory tasks simultaneou...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | zho |
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China InfoCom Media Group
2019-09-01
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| Series: | 物联网学报 |
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| Online Access: | http://www.wlwxb.com.cn/zh/article/doi/10.11959/j.issn.2096-3750.2019.00109/ |
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| author | Changkun JIANG Lin GAO |
| author_facet | Changkun JIANG Lin GAO |
| author_sort | Changkun JIANG |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Crowd sensing is a promising sensing paradigm,which mainly uses a variety of embedded sensors in a large number of mobile devices to accomplish data sensing tasks.One of the key issues in crowd sensing is how to effectively coordinate mobile device users to perform multiple sensory tasks simultaneously.By introducing a new data layer between the sensing task and the user,the similarity of the sensing task and the heterogeneity of the user were effectively utilized,and the joint task selection and user scheduling problems were established on the data layer,aiming at maximizing the social welfare of the whole system.This problem was difficult to solve due to its combinatorial nature and the presence of private information on both the sensing tasks and the users.In order to deal with these problems,a two-sided randomized auction mechanism was proposed,and it was proved that it can satisfy the desirable properties of the computational efficiency,the individual rationality,and the incentive compatibility in expectation.The simulation results show that the proposed stochastic auction mechanism can achieve nearly optimal social welfare,and the social welfare benefits brought by data reuse will increase significantly with the enhancement of task similarity. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-ba7131e1006f4710afab2523b356cb77 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 2096-3750 |
| language | zho |
| publishDate | 2019-09-01 |
| publisher | China InfoCom Media Group |
| record_format | Article |
| series | 物联网学报 |
| spelling | doaj-art-ba7131e1006f4710afab2523b356cb772025-01-15T02:52:33ZzhoChina InfoCom Media Group物联网学报2096-37502019-09-013263359644802Mechanism design for crowd sensing with data reuse based on two-sided auctionChangkun JIANGLin GAOCrowd sensing is a promising sensing paradigm,which mainly uses a variety of embedded sensors in a large number of mobile devices to accomplish data sensing tasks.One of the key issues in crowd sensing is how to effectively coordinate mobile device users to perform multiple sensory tasks simultaneously.By introducing a new data layer between the sensing task and the user,the similarity of the sensing task and the heterogeneity of the user were effectively utilized,and the joint task selection and user scheduling problems were established on the data layer,aiming at maximizing the social welfare of the whole system.This problem was difficult to solve due to its combinatorial nature and the presence of private information on both the sensing tasks and the users.In order to deal with these problems,a two-sided randomized auction mechanism was proposed,and it was proved that it can satisfy the desirable properties of the computational efficiency,the individual rationality,and the incentive compatibility in expectation.The simulation results show that the proposed stochastic auction mechanism can achieve nearly optimal social welfare,and the social welfare benefits brought by data reuse will increase significantly with the enhancement of task similarity.http://www.wlwxb.com.cn/zh/article/doi/10.11959/j.issn.2096-3750.2019.00109/crowd sensingdata reuseincentive mechanismauction mechanism |
| spellingShingle | Changkun JIANG Lin GAO Mechanism design for crowd sensing with data reuse based on two-sided auction 物联网学报 crowd sensing data reuse incentive mechanism auction mechanism |
| title | Mechanism design for crowd sensing with data reuse based on two-sided auction |
| title_full | Mechanism design for crowd sensing with data reuse based on two-sided auction |
| title_fullStr | Mechanism design for crowd sensing with data reuse based on two-sided auction |
| title_full_unstemmed | Mechanism design for crowd sensing with data reuse based on two-sided auction |
| title_short | Mechanism design for crowd sensing with data reuse based on two-sided auction |
| title_sort | mechanism design for crowd sensing with data reuse based on two sided auction |
| topic | crowd sensing data reuse incentive mechanism auction mechanism |
| url | http://www.wlwxb.com.cn/zh/article/doi/10.11959/j.issn.2096-3750.2019.00109/ |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT changkunjiang mechanismdesignforcrowdsensingwithdatareusebasedontwosidedauction AT lingao mechanismdesignforcrowdsensingwithdatareusebasedontwosidedauction |