A game study on the evolution of carbon emission reduction behavior of Chinese power enterprises

A game study on the evolution of carbon emission reduction behavior of Chinese power enterprises

Abstract Carbon verification agencies and power enterprises play a crucial role in the process of reducing carbon emissions. Under government regulation, this paper explores the low-carbon behavior of carbon verification agencies and power enterprises, considering factors such as rewards and penalti...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Yunhan Liu, Changchun Gao, Jusheng Liu
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Nature Portfolio 2025-07-01
Series:Scientific Reports
Subjects:
Carbon emission reduction
Carbon verification
Power enterprise
Collusion
Evolutionary game theory
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-025-08645-4
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https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-025-08645-4

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