Fully Understanding Concept Possession
Can subjects genuinely possess concepts they do not understand fully? A simple argument can show that, on the assumption that possession conditions are taken to fully individuate concepts, this question must be answered in the negative. In this paper, I examine this negative answer as possibly arti...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM)
2018-04-01
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| Series: | Crítica |
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| Online Access: | https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/76 |
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| _version_ | 1849343380929118208 |
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| author | Víctor M. Verdejo |
| author_facet | Víctor M. Verdejo |
| author_sort | Víctor M. Verdejo |
| collection | DOAJ |
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Can subjects genuinely possess concepts they do not understand fully? A simple argument can show that, on the assumption that possession conditions are taken to fully individuate concepts, this question must be answered in the negative.
In this paper, I examine this negative answer as possibly articulated within Christopher Peacocke’s seminal theory. I then discuss four central lines of attack to the view that possession of concepts requires full understanding. I conclude that theorists should acknowledge the existence of indefinitely many cases of genuine concept possession for partially understood concepts and therefore face the determination challenge, namely, the challenge of fully determining concept individuation from concept possession conditions of partially understood concepts.
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| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-305a18423e30450b8547e096b57c20c0 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 0011-1503 1870-4905 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2018-04-01 |
| publisher | Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM) |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Crítica |
| spelling | doaj-art-305a18423e30450b8547e096b57c20c02025-08-20T03:43:01ZengUniversidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM)Crítica0011-15031870-49052018-04-015014810.22201/iifs.18704905e.2018.01Fully Understanding Concept PossessionVíctor M. Verdejo0University of Barcelona, Barcelona Institute of Analytic Philosophy (BIAP) Can subjects genuinely possess concepts they do not understand fully? A simple argument can show that, on the assumption that possession conditions are taken to fully individuate concepts, this question must be answered in the negative. In this paper, I examine this negative answer as possibly articulated within Christopher Peacocke’s seminal theory. I then discuss four central lines of attack to the view that possession of concepts requires full understanding. I conclude that theorists should acknowledge the existence of indefinitely many cases of genuine concept possession for partially understood concepts and therefore face the determination challenge, namely, the challenge of fully determining concept individuation from concept possession conditions of partially understood concepts. https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/76partial understandingconcept individuationimplicit conceptionsanti-individualismdetermination challenge |
| spellingShingle | Víctor M. Verdejo Fully Understanding Concept Possession Crítica partial understanding concept individuation implicit conceptions anti-individualism determination challenge |
| title | Fully Understanding Concept Possession |
| title_full | Fully Understanding Concept Possession |
| title_fullStr | Fully Understanding Concept Possession |
| title_full_unstemmed | Fully Understanding Concept Possession |
| title_short | Fully Understanding Concept Possession |
| title_sort | fully understanding concept possession |
| topic | partial understanding concept individuation implicit conceptions anti-individualism determination challenge |
| url | https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/76 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT victormverdejo fullyunderstandingconceptpossession |