Design and Evaluation of Steganographic Channels in Fifth-Generation New Radio
Mobile communication is ubiquitous in everyday life. The fifth generation of mobile networks (5G) introduced 5G New Radio as a radio access technology that meets current bandwidth, quality, and application requirements. Network steganographic channels that hide secret message transfers in an innocen...
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| Format: | Article |
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MDPI AG
2024-11-01
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| Series: | Future Internet |
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| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/1999-5903/16/11/410 |
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| author | Markus Walter Jörg Keller |
| author_facet | Markus Walter Jörg Keller |
| author_sort | Markus Walter |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Mobile communication is ubiquitous in everyday life. The fifth generation of mobile networks (5G) introduced 5G New Radio as a radio access technology that meets current bandwidth, quality, and application requirements. Network steganographic channels that hide secret message transfers in an innocent carrier communication are a particular threat in mobile communications as these channels are often used for malware, ransomware, and data leakage. We systematically analyze the protocol stack of the 5G–air interface for its susceptibility to network steganography, addressing both storage and timing channels. To ensure large coverage, we apply hiding patterns that collect the essential ideas used to create steganographic channels. Based on the results of this analysis, we design and implement a network covert storage channel, exploiting reserved bits in the header of the Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP). the covert sender and receiver are located in a 5G base station and mobile device, respectively. Furthermore, we sketch a timing channel based on a recent overshadowing attack. We evaluate our steganographic storage channel both in simulation and real-world experiments with respect to steganographic bandwidth, robustness, and stealthiness. Moreover, we discuss countermeasures. Our implementation demonstrates the feasibility of a covert channel in 5G New Radio and the possibility of achieving large steganographic bandwidth for broadband transmissions. We also demonstrate that the detection of the channel by a network analyzer is possible, limiting its scope to application scenarios where operators are unaware or ignorant of this threat. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-1f70570a10ca4f6eb4832e511da7e7f6 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1999-5903 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2024-11-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Future Internet |
| spelling | doaj-art-1f70570a10ca4f6eb4832e511da7e7f62024-11-26T18:05:14ZengMDPI AGFuture Internet1999-59032024-11-01161141010.3390/fi16110410Design and Evaluation of Steganographic Channels in Fifth-Generation New RadioMarkus Walter0Jörg Keller1Federal Office for Information Security, 53175 Bonn, GermanyFaculty of Mathematics and Computer Science, FernUniversität in Hagen, 58084 Hagen, GermanyMobile communication is ubiquitous in everyday life. The fifth generation of mobile networks (5G) introduced 5G New Radio as a radio access technology that meets current bandwidth, quality, and application requirements. Network steganographic channels that hide secret message transfers in an innocent carrier communication are a particular threat in mobile communications as these channels are often used for malware, ransomware, and data leakage. We systematically analyze the protocol stack of the 5G–air interface for its susceptibility to network steganography, addressing both storage and timing channels. To ensure large coverage, we apply hiding patterns that collect the essential ideas used to create steganographic channels. Based on the results of this analysis, we design and implement a network covert storage channel, exploiting reserved bits in the header of the Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP). the covert sender and receiver are located in a 5G base station and mobile device, respectively. Furthermore, we sketch a timing channel based on a recent overshadowing attack. We evaluate our steganographic storage channel both in simulation and real-world experiments with respect to steganographic bandwidth, robustness, and stealthiness. Moreover, we discuss countermeasures. Our implementation demonstrates the feasibility of a covert channel in 5G New Radio and the possibility of achieving large steganographic bandwidth for broadband transmissions. We also demonstrate that the detection of the channel by a network analyzer is possible, limiting its scope to application scenarios where operators are unaware or ignorant of this threat.https://www.mdpi.com/1999-5903/16/11/410information hidingnetwork steganographymobile networks5G |
| spellingShingle | Markus Walter Jörg Keller Design and Evaluation of Steganographic Channels in Fifth-Generation New Radio Future Internet information hiding network steganography mobile networks 5G |
| title | Design and Evaluation of Steganographic Channels in Fifth-Generation New Radio |
| title_full | Design and Evaluation of Steganographic Channels in Fifth-Generation New Radio |
| title_fullStr | Design and Evaluation of Steganographic Channels in Fifth-Generation New Radio |
| title_full_unstemmed | Design and Evaluation of Steganographic Channels in Fifth-Generation New Radio |
| title_short | Design and Evaluation of Steganographic Channels in Fifth-Generation New Radio |
| title_sort | design and evaluation of steganographic channels in fifth generation new radio |
| topic | information hiding network steganography mobile networks 5G |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/1999-5903/16/11/410 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT markuswalter designandevaluationofsteganographicchannelsinfifthgenerationnewradio AT jorgkeller designandevaluationofsteganographicchannelsinfifthgenerationnewradio |