Conflict of interest: justifying international cooperation in populist discourse

Contrary to the stereotypical assumption that the foreign policy of populists is geared toward conflict, much of the literature in recent years has converged on the understanding that populism results in a complex and often seemingly incoherent mix of cooperation and confrontation. Populist leaders...

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Main Authors: Angelos Chryssogelos, Gustav Meibauer
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Frontiers Media S.A. 2025-08-01
Series:Frontiers in Political Science
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Online Access:https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpos.2025.1623155/full
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author Angelos Chryssogelos
Gustav Meibauer
author_facet Angelos Chryssogelos
Gustav Meibauer
author_sort Angelos Chryssogelos
collection DOAJ
description Contrary to the stereotypical assumption that the foreign policy of populists is geared toward conflict, much of the literature in recent years has converged on the understanding that populism results in a complex and often seemingly incoherent mix of cooperation and confrontation. Populist leaders often adopt a confrontational stance toward other states and international institutions, yet they are also capable of striking deals, defusing tensions and reconciling with multilateral settings. This inconsistency is due to a variety of factors like geopolitical and economic pressures or the thick-ideological proclivities of populists. But in this article, we are interested in how populists reconcile the contradictory trend to antagonize internationally but end up striking deals. Drawing on the literature on populist discourses and a view of foreign policy as political management of state-society relations, we argue that this reconciliation takes place primarily at a discursive level, as populists deploy a discourse of cooperation that remains consistent with the binary and Manichean logic of populism. We identify three populist discursive strategies of justifying cooperation after conflict: elite-splitting, issue-bundling and audience-hopping. We demonstrate our argument by comparing two cases of populist compromising with the EU following a protracted period of confrontation: Greece’s acceptance of a third bailout from the Eurozone under Alexis Tsipras in 2015; and Britain’s signing of a final Brexit deal under Boris Johnson in 2020.
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spelling doaj-art-fc8a919713e94e21b792e3d632c5a88b2025-08-26T08:07:00ZengFrontiers Media S.A.Frontiers in Political Science2673-31452025-08-01710.3389/fpos.2025.16231551623155Conflict of interest: justifying international cooperation in populist discourseAngelos Chryssogelos0Gustav Meibauer1School of Social Sciences and Professions, London Metropolitan University, London, United KingdomDepartment of Political Science, Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, NetherlandsContrary to the stereotypical assumption that the foreign policy of populists is geared toward conflict, much of the literature in recent years has converged on the understanding that populism results in a complex and often seemingly incoherent mix of cooperation and confrontation. Populist leaders often adopt a confrontational stance toward other states and international institutions, yet they are also capable of striking deals, defusing tensions and reconciling with multilateral settings. This inconsistency is due to a variety of factors like geopolitical and economic pressures or the thick-ideological proclivities of populists. But in this article, we are interested in how populists reconcile the contradictory trend to antagonize internationally but end up striking deals. Drawing on the literature on populist discourses and a view of foreign policy as political management of state-society relations, we argue that this reconciliation takes place primarily at a discursive level, as populists deploy a discourse of cooperation that remains consistent with the binary and Manichean logic of populism. We identify three populist discursive strategies of justifying cooperation after conflict: elite-splitting, issue-bundling and audience-hopping. We demonstrate our argument by comparing two cases of populist compromising with the EU following a protracted period of confrontation: Greece’s acceptance of a third bailout from the Eurozone under Alexis Tsipras in 2015; and Britain’s signing of a final Brexit deal under Boris Johnson in 2020.https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpos.2025.1623155/fullpopulismforeign policypolitical discoursepolitical partiesBrexitEurozone crisis
spellingShingle Angelos Chryssogelos
Gustav Meibauer
Conflict of interest: justifying international cooperation in populist discourse
Frontiers in Political Science
populism
foreign policy
political discourse
political parties
Brexit
Eurozone crisis
title Conflict of interest: justifying international cooperation in populist discourse
title_full Conflict of interest: justifying international cooperation in populist discourse
title_fullStr Conflict of interest: justifying international cooperation in populist discourse
title_full_unstemmed Conflict of interest: justifying international cooperation in populist discourse
title_short Conflict of interest: justifying international cooperation in populist discourse
title_sort conflict of interest justifying international cooperation in populist discourse
topic populism
foreign policy
political discourse
political parties
Brexit
Eurozone crisis
url https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpos.2025.1623155/full
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