Essence and Modality: Continued Debate
Here I offer a critical evaluation of modalism about essential properties. To that effect, I begin by rehearsing Fine’s now infamous counterexamples to pure modalism. I then consider two recent defenses of it, offered by Livingstone-Banks and Cowling, respectively. I argue that both defenses fail. N...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | ces |
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Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences
2024-08-01
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| Series: | Organon F |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/0908090610.31577:orgf.2024.31305.pdf |
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| Summary: | Here I offer a critical evaluation of modalism about essential properties. To that effect, I begin by rehearsing Fine’s now infamous counterexamples to pure modalism. I then consider two recent defenses of it, offered by Livingstone-Banks and Cowling, respectively. I argue that both defenses fail. Next I consider the most plausible variety of impure modalism – sparse modalism – which has recently been defended by Wildman and de Melo. Skiles has argued that sparse modalism fails too. I argue that Skiles’s counterexamples mis-fire; nonetheless, his conclusion that, like pure modalism, sparse modalism is too broad, is on the right track. And so, I offer an original objection – the sparse modal propria counterexample – to show that this is so. I conclude by considering ways the modalist might once again modify her account to circumvent this new objection and improve the account’s extensional adequacy. |
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| ISSN: | 1335-0668 2585-7150 |