Revisiting legal positivism: H. Hart’s 1958 conception of legal reasoning in the lens of G. Postema

The article explores the 1958 “Harvard” conception of legal reasoning presented by the British philosopher and jurist Herbert Hart, within the context of a contemporary reinterpretation by American jurist and historian of legal thought, Gerald Postema. Postema’s interpretation, labeling Hart’s view...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Sergei N. Kasatkin
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia (RUDN University) 2024-12-01
Series:RUDN Journal of Law
Subjects:
Online Access:https://journals.rudn.ru/law/article/viewFile/41929/24167
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:The article explores the 1958 “Harvard” conception of legal reasoning presented by the British philosopher and jurist Herbert Hart, within the context of a contemporary reinterpretation by American jurist and historian of legal thought, Gerald Postema. Postema’s interpretation, labeling Hart’s view as “settled-meaning positivism”, posits it as a unity that encompasses both the delineation of distinct types of argumentation in the realms of “core” and “penumbra” (linguistically mediated clear and controversial cases of law enforcement) and the reduction of law and legal reasoning to the “core” of rules and their established linguistic meanings. The article aims to analyze Postema’s perspective in the broader context of the evolution of Hart’s views on legal indeterminacy and judicial decision-making. The relevance of this topic lies in the necessity for a more comprehensive and balanced reconstruction of Hart’s theory, which is paradigmatic for modern positivism and Anglophone jurisprudence, in the light of the contentious and narrow character of its assessments. The authority of the Postema’s interpretation, seen as providing new insights into the work of the British jurist, adds to the relevance of this analysis. The research uses diverse, primarily hermeneutical, methods, drawing from Postema’s paper and the available body of Hart’s writings, as well as the representative biographical and scientific literature. The article examines the historical context of the 1958 essay’s creation and the doctrine of judicial reasoning contained within it. Ultimately, while recognizing the stimulating role of Postema’s re-description of the 1958 doctrine, the article finds some of its key assertions (including Hart’s understanding of the nature of legal indeterminacy and judicial choice, the attribution of “settle-meaning positivism”, and a doctrine of the rule of law) to be contentious or unwarranted.
ISSN:2313-2337
2408-9001