When and why does observability increase honesty? The role of gossip and reputational concern
People frequently engage in dishonest behavior, which entails costs to society. A common advice to increase honesty is to enhance observability. However, previous research produced conflicting findings, making it unclear when and why observability increases honesty. Here we show that observability e...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Cambridge University Press
2025-01-01
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| Series: | Judgment and Decision Making |
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| Online Access: | https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S193029752400010X/type/journal_article |
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| author | Annika S. Nieper Bianca Beersma Maria T. M. Dijkstra Gerben A. Van Kleef |
| author_facet | Annika S. Nieper Bianca Beersma Maria T. M. Dijkstra Gerben A. Van Kleef |
| author_sort | Annika S. Nieper |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | People frequently engage in dishonest behavior, which entails costs to society. A common advice to increase honesty is to enhance observability. However, previous research produced conflicting findings, making it unclear when and why observability increases honesty. Here we show that observability enhances honesty when observers can gossip to relevant others (i.e., to future interaction partners who can influence the gossip target’s outcome), because it increases reputational concern. In 2 incentivized and pre-registered studies, participants privately rolled a die 30 times and were informed that reporting higher numbers would lead to higher outcomes (total N = 1608; 28650 observations). We manipulated observability and gossip. Both studies revealed that gossip to relevant others decreased dishonest reporting, whereas mere observation did not. Importantly, reputational concern partly mediated the impact of gossip on dishonesty. Moreover, gossip influenced recipients’ trust in gossip targets, with messages denoting dishonesty swaying trust more than messages denoting honesty. Our findings demonstrate when and why observability promotes honesty. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-e681be9bad4a434784f7103727bf8864 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1930-2975 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2025-01-01 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Judgment and Decision Making |
| spelling | doaj-art-e681be9bad4a434784f7103727bf88642025-01-16T21:46:49ZengCambridge University PressJudgment and Decision Making1930-29752025-01-012010.1017/jdm.2024.10When and why does observability increase honesty? The role of gossip and reputational concernAnnika S. Nieper0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9534-7482Bianca Beersma1Maria T. M. Dijkstra2Gerben A. Van Kleef3Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, NetherlandsVrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, NetherlandsVrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, NetherlandsUniversiteit van Amsterdam, Amsterdam, NetherlandsPeople frequently engage in dishonest behavior, which entails costs to society. A common advice to increase honesty is to enhance observability. However, previous research produced conflicting findings, making it unclear when and why observability increases honesty. Here we show that observability enhances honesty when observers can gossip to relevant others (i.e., to future interaction partners who can influence the gossip target’s outcome), because it increases reputational concern. In 2 incentivized and pre-registered studies, participants privately rolled a die 30 times and were informed that reporting higher numbers would lead to higher outcomes (total N = 1608; 28650 observations). We manipulated observability and gossip. Both studies revealed that gossip to relevant others decreased dishonest reporting, whereas mere observation did not. Importantly, reputational concern partly mediated the impact of gossip on dishonesty. Moreover, gossip influenced recipients’ trust in gossip targets, with messages denoting dishonesty swaying trust more than messages denoting honesty. Our findings demonstrate when and why observability promotes honesty.https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S193029752400010X/type/journal_articlegossipreputationobservabilityunethical behaviorcheatinghonesty |
| spellingShingle | Annika S. Nieper Bianca Beersma Maria T. M. Dijkstra Gerben A. Van Kleef When and why does observability increase honesty? The role of gossip and reputational concern Judgment and Decision Making gossip reputation observability unethical behavior cheating honesty |
| title | When and why does observability increase honesty? The role of gossip and reputational concern |
| title_full | When and why does observability increase honesty? The role of gossip and reputational concern |
| title_fullStr | When and why does observability increase honesty? The role of gossip and reputational concern |
| title_full_unstemmed | When and why does observability increase honesty? The role of gossip and reputational concern |
| title_short | When and why does observability increase honesty? The role of gossip and reputational concern |
| title_sort | when and why does observability increase honesty the role of gossip and reputational concern |
| topic | gossip reputation observability unethical behavior cheating honesty |
| url | https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S193029752400010X/type/journal_article |
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