Do actors’ incentives obstruct sector-wide long-term productivity in the design and production of bridges in Sweden?

An increase in productivity is necessary to reduce economic costs in bridge projects. Previous research indicates that construction productivity has decreased since the 1960s. A quantitative study was performed to find out how the incentives of the three major actors (client, contractor, and design...

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Main Authors: Johan Lagerkvist, Petra Bosch-Sijtsema, Ola Lӕdre, Mats Karlsson, Peter Simonsson, Rasmus Rempling
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Vilnius Gediminas Technical University 2024-12-01
Series:Journal of Civil Engineering and Management
Subjects:
Online Access:https://jest.vgtu.lt/index.php/JCEM/article/view/22720
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author Johan Lagerkvist
Petra Bosch-Sijtsema
Ola Lӕdre
Mats Karlsson
Peter Simonsson
Rasmus Rempling
author_facet Johan Lagerkvist
Petra Bosch-Sijtsema
Ola Lӕdre
Mats Karlsson
Peter Simonsson
Rasmus Rempling
author_sort Johan Lagerkvist
collection DOAJ
description An increase in productivity is necessary to reduce economic costs in bridge projects. Previous research indicates that construction productivity has decreased since the 1960s. A quantitative study was performed to find out how the incentives of the three major actors (client, contractor, and design engineer) could be obstacles to long-term productivity in the Swedish bridge construction industry. The study was performed as a self-completed questionnaire and received 151 responses. The results show that the contractors’ employees find profit in a single project more important than the company’s profit over time. Thus, the project´s incentives obstruct innovation and standardization, which could benefit future projects and thereby increase long-term productivity and the company’s profit over time. In contrast to contractors, design engineers and clients value company profit more than profit in a single project, and they value the quality of delivered products as the most important factor for increased long-term productivity. First published online 10 December 2024
format Article
id doaj-art-d44ea876f6154fc9845e825119b49c70
institution Kabale University
issn 1392-3730
1822-3605
language English
publishDate 2024-12-01
publisher Vilnius Gediminas Technical University
record_format Article
series Journal of Civil Engineering and Management
spelling doaj-art-d44ea876f6154fc9845e825119b49c702024-12-10T16:29:28ZengVilnius Gediminas Technical UniversityJournal of Civil Engineering and Management1392-37301822-36052024-12-0110.3846/jcem.2024.22720Do actors’ incentives obstruct sector-wide long-term productivity in the design and production of bridges in Sweden?Johan Lagerkvist0Petra Bosch-Sijtsema1Ola Lӕdre2Mats Karlsson3Peter Simonsson4Rasmus Rempling5Department of Architecture and Civil Engineering, Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg, Sweden; Swedish Transport Administration, Borlänge, SwedenDepartment of Technology Management and Economics, Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg, SwedenDepartment of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, NorwayDepartment of Architecture and Civil Engineering, Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg, Sweden; Swedish Transport Administration, Borlänge, SwedenSwedish Transport Administration, Borlänge, SwedenDepartment of Architecture and Civil Engineering, Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg, Sweden An increase in productivity is necessary to reduce economic costs in bridge projects. Previous research indicates that construction productivity has decreased since the 1960s. A quantitative study was performed to find out how the incentives of the three major actors (client, contractor, and design engineer) could be obstacles to long-term productivity in the Swedish bridge construction industry. The study was performed as a self-completed questionnaire and received 151 responses. The results show that the contractors’ employees find profit in a single project more important than the company’s profit over time. Thus, the project´s incentives obstruct innovation and standardization, which could benefit future projects and thereby increase long-term productivity and the company’s profit over time. In contrast to contractors, design engineers and clients value company profit more than profit in a single project, and they value the quality of delivered products as the most important factor for increased long-term productivity. First published online 10 December 2024 https://jest.vgtu.lt/index.php/JCEM/article/view/22720productivityincentivesobstaclesearly contractor involvementdesign-builddesign-bid-build
spellingShingle Johan Lagerkvist
Petra Bosch-Sijtsema
Ola Lӕdre
Mats Karlsson
Peter Simonsson
Rasmus Rempling
Do actors’ incentives obstruct sector-wide long-term productivity in the design and production of bridges in Sweden?
Journal of Civil Engineering and Management
productivity
incentives
obstacles
early contractor involvement
design-build
design-bid-build
title Do actors’ incentives obstruct sector-wide long-term productivity in the design and production of bridges in Sweden?
title_full Do actors’ incentives obstruct sector-wide long-term productivity in the design and production of bridges in Sweden?
title_fullStr Do actors’ incentives obstruct sector-wide long-term productivity in the design and production of bridges in Sweden?
title_full_unstemmed Do actors’ incentives obstruct sector-wide long-term productivity in the design and production of bridges in Sweden?
title_short Do actors’ incentives obstruct sector-wide long-term productivity in the design and production of bridges in Sweden?
title_sort do actors incentives obstruct sector wide long term productivity in the design and production of bridges in sweden
topic productivity
incentives
obstacles
early contractor involvement
design-build
design-bid-build
url https://jest.vgtu.lt/index.php/JCEM/article/view/22720
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