L’abdication du Congrès après le 11 septembre : crise constitutionnelle ou politique ?
Congressional Abdication After 9/11 : Constitutional Crisis or Political Deadlock ?The 9/11 attacks dramatically altered the relationship existing between the branches of government, especially between Congress and the White House. While some had (hastily) qualified George W. Bush after his taking o...
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Laboratoire d’Etudes et de Recherches sur le Monde Anglophone (LERMA)
2011-09-01
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| Series: | E-REA |
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| Online Access: | https://journals.openedition.org/erea/2030 |
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| author | Maya KANDEL |
| author_facet | Maya KANDEL |
| author_sort | Maya KANDEL |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Congressional Abdication After 9/11 : Constitutional Crisis or Political Deadlock ?The 9/11 attacks dramatically altered the relationship existing between the branches of government, especially between Congress and the White House. While some had (hastily) qualified George W. Bush after his taking office in January 2001 as first “post-imperial president” facing a newly assertive Congress, the war on terror brought back the imperial presidency and reduced Congressmen to a passive role.Historically, such an evolution was expected : it was very likely that any president, Republican or Democrat, would have acquired more authority in the aftermath of 9/11 and claimed victory in the “struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy.”But the Bush administration went much further than that. By his extensive use of “signing statements,” George W. Bush claimed the right to interpret, or even pick out, or correct, specific sections of the legislation passed by Congress – a practice he did not invent, but of which he did make unprecedented use. The same can be said of the “executive privilege” argument (secrecy). With other methods, vice-president Dick Cheney, the chief artisan of this expansion of the president’s powers, was particularly skillful in taming Congress by his stranglehold on Republican lawmakers – and most notably his attendance at the Republican Caucus’ weekly strategy sessions on Capitol Hill.All this has led many commentators to speak of a constitutional crisis and of an executive branch less accountable than at any time in modern American history.The depth of Congress’ deference certainly reflected the enormity of the attacks, the belief that lawmakers should defer to strong presidential leadership in times of national crisis, and a conscious and thorough effort on the part of some of President Bush’s closest advisers. But it also reflected a good dose of politics. This in turn stemmed from several key aspects of the contemporary American political landscape : a Congress more fractious and polarized than at any time in the last hundred years (an obvious trend starting with the 1994 elections), and a Democratic party still not at ease with foreign policy and the Vietnam heritage. These political factors, among others, enabled Bush and the Republican party to make the best use of the “patriotism argument” to tame Democratic Congressmen – including when Democrats held a majority in the Senate – while successfully invoking party loyalty with Republican lawmakers. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-d2fa1d049d97433a81be28d46625d4db |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1638-1718 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2011-09-01 |
| publisher | Laboratoire d’Etudes et de Recherches sur le Monde Anglophone (LERMA) |
| record_format | Article |
| series | E-REA |
| spelling | doaj-art-d2fa1d049d97433a81be28d46625d4db2025-01-09T12:53:30ZengLaboratoire d’Etudes et de Recherches sur le Monde Anglophone (LERMA)E-REA1638-17182011-09-019110.4000/erea.2030L’abdication du Congrès après le 11 septembre : crise constitutionnelle ou politique ?Maya KANDELCongressional Abdication After 9/11 : Constitutional Crisis or Political Deadlock ?The 9/11 attacks dramatically altered the relationship existing between the branches of government, especially between Congress and the White House. While some had (hastily) qualified George W. Bush after his taking office in January 2001 as first “post-imperial president” facing a newly assertive Congress, the war on terror brought back the imperial presidency and reduced Congressmen to a passive role.Historically, such an evolution was expected : it was very likely that any president, Republican or Democrat, would have acquired more authority in the aftermath of 9/11 and claimed victory in the “struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy.”But the Bush administration went much further than that. By his extensive use of “signing statements,” George W. Bush claimed the right to interpret, or even pick out, or correct, specific sections of the legislation passed by Congress – a practice he did not invent, but of which he did make unprecedented use. The same can be said of the “executive privilege” argument (secrecy). With other methods, vice-president Dick Cheney, the chief artisan of this expansion of the president’s powers, was particularly skillful in taming Congress by his stranglehold on Republican lawmakers – and most notably his attendance at the Republican Caucus’ weekly strategy sessions on Capitol Hill.All this has led many commentators to speak of a constitutional crisis and of an executive branch less accountable than at any time in modern American history.The depth of Congress’ deference certainly reflected the enormity of the attacks, the belief that lawmakers should defer to strong presidential leadership in times of national crisis, and a conscious and thorough effort on the part of some of President Bush’s closest advisers. But it also reflected a good dose of politics. This in turn stemmed from several key aspects of the contemporary American political landscape : a Congress more fractious and polarized than at any time in the last hundred years (an obvious trend starting with the 1994 elections), and a Democratic party still not at ease with foreign policy and the Vietnam heritage. These political factors, among others, enabled Bush and the Republican party to make the best use of the “patriotism argument” to tame Democratic Congressmen – including when Democrats held a majority in the Senate – while successfully invoking party loyalty with Republican lawmakers.https://journals.openedition.org/erea/2030United StatesCongressUS Presidentforeign policywar powersattacks |
| spellingShingle | Maya KANDEL L’abdication du Congrès après le 11 septembre : crise constitutionnelle ou politique ? E-REA United States Congress US President foreign policy war powers attacks |
| title | L’abdication du Congrès après le 11 septembre : crise constitutionnelle ou politique ? |
| title_full | L’abdication du Congrès après le 11 septembre : crise constitutionnelle ou politique ? |
| title_fullStr | L’abdication du Congrès après le 11 septembre : crise constitutionnelle ou politique ? |
| title_full_unstemmed | L’abdication du Congrès après le 11 septembre : crise constitutionnelle ou politique ? |
| title_short | L’abdication du Congrès après le 11 septembre : crise constitutionnelle ou politique ? |
| title_sort | l abdication du congres apres le 11 septembre crise constitutionnelle ou politique |
| topic | United States Congress US President foreign policy war powers attacks |
| url | https://journals.openedition.org/erea/2030 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT mayakandel labdicationducongresapresle11septembrecriseconstitutionnelleoupolitique |