Quantum Chosen-Cipher Attack on Camellia
The Feistel structure represents a fundamental architectural component within the domain of symmetric cryptographic algorithms, with a substantial body of research conducted within the context of classical computing environments. Nevertheless, research into specific symmetric cryptographic algorithm...
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| Format: | Article |
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MDPI AG
2025-04-01
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| Series: | Mathematics |
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| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/13/9/1383 |
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| author | Yanjun Li Qi Wang Dingyun Huang Jian Liu Huiqin Xie |
| author_facet | Yanjun Li Qi Wang Dingyun Huang Jian Liu Huiqin Xie |
| author_sort | Yanjun Li |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The Feistel structure represents a fundamental architectural component within the domain of symmetric cryptographic algorithms, with a substantial body of research conducted within the context of classical computing environments. Nevertheless, research into specific symmetric cryptographic algorithms utilizing the Feistel structure is relatively scarce in quantum computing environments. This paper, for the first time, proposes a five-round distinguisher for Camellia under the quantum chosen-ciphertext attack (qCCA) setting, with its effectiveness empirically validated. Additionally, by combining Grover’s algorithm and Simon’s algorithm, we construct a nine-round key-recovery attack model against Camellia. Through an in-depth analysis of Camellia’s key expansion algorithm, we significantly reduce the complexity of the key-recovery attack. The proposed attack achieves a time complexity of 2<sup>61.5</sup> for recovering the correct key bits and requires 531 quantum bits. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-ba25ba4d87e24567a53b46c47f38dba3 |
| institution | OA Journals |
| issn | 2227-7390 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2025-04-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Mathematics |
| spelling | doaj-art-ba25ba4d87e24567a53b46c47f38dba32025-08-20T02:24:49ZengMDPI AGMathematics2227-73902025-04-01139138310.3390/math13091383Quantum Chosen-Cipher Attack on CamelliaYanjun Li0Qi Wang1Dingyun Huang2Jian Liu3Huiqin Xie4Infomation Industry lnformation Security Evaluation Center, The 15th Research Institute of China Electronics Technology Group Corporation, Beijing 100083, ChinaDepartment of Cryptography Science and Technology, Beijing Electronic Science and Technology Institute, Beijing 100070, ChinaDepartment of Cryptography Science and Technology, Beijing Electronic Science and Technology Institute, Beijing 100070, ChinaInfomation Industry lnformation Security Evaluation Center, The 15th Research Institute of China Electronics Technology Group Corporation, Beijing 100083, ChinaDepartment of Cryptography Science and Technology, Beijing Electronic Science and Technology Institute, Beijing 100070, ChinaThe Feistel structure represents a fundamental architectural component within the domain of symmetric cryptographic algorithms, with a substantial body of research conducted within the context of classical computing environments. Nevertheless, research into specific symmetric cryptographic algorithms utilizing the Feistel structure is relatively scarce in quantum computing environments. This paper, for the first time, proposes a five-round distinguisher for Camellia under the quantum chosen-ciphertext attack (qCCA) setting, with its effectiveness empirically validated. Additionally, by combining Grover’s algorithm and Simon’s algorithm, we construct a nine-round key-recovery attack model against Camellia. Through an in-depth analysis of Camellia’s key expansion algorithm, we significantly reduce the complexity of the key-recovery attack. The proposed attack achieves a time complexity of 2<sup>61.5</sup> for recovering the correct key bits and requires 531 quantum bits.https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/13/9/1383Feistel cipherquantum chosen-ciphertext attacksGrover’s algorithmSimon’s algorithmCamellia |
| spellingShingle | Yanjun Li Qi Wang Dingyun Huang Jian Liu Huiqin Xie Quantum Chosen-Cipher Attack on Camellia Mathematics Feistel cipher quantum chosen-ciphertext attacks Grover’s algorithm Simon’s algorithm Camellia |
| title | Quantum Chosen-Cipher Attack on Camellia |
| title_full | Quantum Chosen-Cipher Attack on Camellia |
| title_fullStr | Quantum Chosen-Cipher Attack on Camellia |
| title_full_unstemmed | Quantum Chosen-Cipher Attack on Camellia |
| title_short | Quantum Chosen-Cipher Attack on Camellia |
| title_sort | quantum chosen cipher attack on camellia |
| topic | Feistel cipher quantum chosen-ciphertext attacks Grover’s algorithm Simon’s algorithm Camellia |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/13/9/1383 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT yanjunli quantumchosencipherattackoncamellia AT qiwang quantumchosencipherattackoncamellia AT dingyunhuang quantumchosencipherattackoncamellia AT jianliu quantumchosencipherattackoncamellia AT huiqinxie quantumchosencipherattackoncamellia |