Quantum Chosen-Cipher Attack on Camellia
The Feistel structure represents a fundamental architectural component within the domain of symmetric cryptographic algorithms, with a substantial body of research conducted within the context of classical computing environments. Nevertheless, research into specific symmetric cryptographic algorithm...
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| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
MDPI AG
2025-04-01
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| Series: | Mathematics |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/13/9/1383 |
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| Summary: | The Feistel structure represents a fundamental architectural component within the domain of symmetric cryptographic algorithms, with a substantial body of research conducted within the context of classical computing environments. Nevertheless, research into specific symmetric cryptographic algorithms utilizing the Feistel structure is relatively scarce in quantum computing environments. This paper, for the first time, proposes a five-round distinguisher for Camellia under the quantum chosen-ciphertext attack (qCCA) setting, with its effectiveness empirically validated. Additionally, by combining Grover’s algorithm and Simon’s algorithm, we construct a nine-round key-recovery attack model against Camellia. Through an in-depth analysis of Camellia’s key expansion algorithm, we significantly reduce the complexity of the key-recovery attack. The proposed attack achieves a time complexity of 2<sup>61.5</sup> for recovering the correct key bits and requires 531 quantum bits. |
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| ISSN: | 2227-7390 |