Designing Equilibria in Concurrent Games with Social Welfare and Temporal Logic Constraints
In game theory, mechanism design is concerned with the design of incentives so that a desired outcome of the game can be achieved. In this paper, we explore the concept of equilibrium design, where incentives are designed to obtain a desirable equilibrium that satisfies a specific temporal logic pro...
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| Main Authors: | Julian Gutierrez, Muhammad Najib, Giuseppe Perelli, Michael Wooldridge |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Logical Methods in Computer Science e.V.
2024-12-01
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| Series: | Logical Methods in Computer Science |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://lmcs.episciences.org/11435/pdf |
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