The Specificity of the First Cognitive Acts in Realist Metaphysics as interpreted by Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and Stanisław Kamiński

The issue of the first cognitive acts is a decisive factor in the adopted methods of philosophical explanation of reality. The concept of the first cognitive acts presented in this article was developed by M. A. Krąpiec and S. Kamiński within the framework of realist metaphysics. They methodological...

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Main Author: Paweł Gondek
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: International Étienne Gilson Society 2024-12-01
Series:Studia Gilsoniana
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Online Access:http://gilsonsociety.com/files/841-858_Gondek.pdf
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author Paweł Gondek
author_facet Paweł Gondek
author_sort Paweł Gondek
collection DOAJ
description The issue of the first cognitive acts is a decisive factor in the adopted methods of philosophical explanation of reality. The concept of the first cognitive acts presented in this article was developed by M. A. Krąpiec and S. Kamiński within the framework of realist metaphysics. They methodologically elaborated the problem of the primordial metaphysical experience, which constitutes a direct and assumption-free reference to existing things. The interpretative difficulties that arise in this area result from the need to engage pre-scientific sources of cognition at the starting point. Simultaneously, the value of this cognition is emphasized in the aspect of affirming the existence of something beyond the subject, which is expressed through the existential judgment and constitutes a preconception of the proper object of philosophy. In this conception, the first cognitive acts are accepted with appropriate refinement. This includes the dialectical method, which allows for a justified transition from pre-scientific cognitive results to preliminary philosophical assertions about reality. Subsequently, the intuitive-reductive method is introduced, in which, for a specified effectual state, we indicate the sole and ultimate ontic cause. In this method, the context of states of affairs constitutes a necessary condition for accepting theses. On such foundations, in realist metaphysics, one moves from the first cognitive acts to the formulation of systematic theses.
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spelling doaj-art-9b39b8b613b04d08902ca8cc53efa9c72025-01-10T19:09:10ZengInternational Étienne Gilson SocietyStudia Gilsoniana2300-00662577-03142024-12-0113484185810.26385/SG.130434The Specificity of the First Cognitive Acts in Realist Metaphysics as interpreted by Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and Stanisław KamińskiPaweł GondekThe issue of the first cognitive acts is a decisive factor in the adopted methods of philosophical explanation of reality. The concept of the first cognitive acts presented in this article was developed by M. A. Krąpiec and S. Kamiński within the framework of realist metaphysics. They methodologically elaborated the problem of the primordial metaphysical experience, which constitutes a direct and assumption-free reference to existing things. The interpretative difficulties that arise in this area result from the need to engage pre-scientific sources of cognition at the starting point. Simultaneously, the value of this cognition is emphasized in the aspect of affirming the existence of something beyond the subject, which is expressed through the existential judgment and constitutes a preconception of the proper object of philosophy. In this conception, the first cognitive acts are accepted with appropriate refinement. This includes the dialectical method, which allows for a justified transition from pre-scientific cognitive results to preliminary philosophical assertions about reality. Subsequently, the intuitive-reductive method is introduced, in which, for a specified effectual state, we indicate the sole and ultimate ontic cause. In this method, the context of states of affairs constitutes a necessary condition for accepting theses. On such foundations, in realist metaphysics, one moves from the first cognitive acts to the formulation of systematic theses.http://gilsonsociety.com/files/841-858_Gondek.pdfcognitive actsrealityexistential judgmentdialecticrealist metaphysics
spellingShingle Paweł Gondek
The Specificity of the First Cognitive Acts in Realist Metaphysics as interpreted by Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and Stanisław Kamiński
Studia Gilsoniana
cognitive acts
reality
existential judgment
dialectic
realist metaphysics
title The Specificity of the First Cognitive Acts in Realist Metaphysics as interpreted by Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and Stanisław Kamiński
title_full The Specificity of the First Cognitive Acts in Realist Metaphysics as interpreted by Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and Stanisław Kamiński
title_fullStr The Specificity of the First Cognitive Acts in Realist Metaphysics as interpreted by Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and Stanisław Kamiński
title_full_unstemmed The Specificity of the First Cognitive Acts in Realist Metaphysics as interpreted by Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and Stanisław Kamiński
title_short The Specificity of the First Cognitive Acts in Realist Metaphysics as interpreted by Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and Stanisław Kamiński
title_sort specificity of the first cognitive acts in realist metaphysics as interpreted by mieczyslaw a krapiec and stanislaw kaminski
topic cognitive acts
reality
existential judgment
dialectic
realist metaphysics
url http://gilsonsociety.com/files/841-858_Gondek.pdf
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AT pawełgondek specificityofthefirstcognitiveactsinrealistmetaphysicsasinterpretedbymieczysławakrapiecandstanisławkaminski