Match Stability with a Costly and Flexible Number of Positions
One of the main goals of two-sided matching mechanisms is to pair two groups of agents in a stable manner. Stability means that no pair of agents has an incentive to deviate from their assigned match. The outcome of such a match can have significant consequences for the participants involved. Most e...
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| Main Authors: | James Gilmore, David Porter |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
MDPI AG
2025-05-01
|
| Series: | Games |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/3/27 |
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