Condiciones de posibilidad de las atribuciones mentales en la díada humano-inteligencia artificial
This essay discusses the limits of mental attribution between humans and intelligent machines. Starting from the ontological presuppositions of functionalism and technological transhumanism that a strong Artificial Intelligence (strong-AI) with mental states could be feasible, I analyse the conditio...
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | deu |
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FICUM
2024-12-01
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| Series: | Claridades: Revista de Filosofía |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://revistas.uma.es/index.php/claridades/article/view/19290/20847 |
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| Summary: | This essay discusses the limits of mental attribution between humans and intelligent machines. Starting from the ontological presuppositions of functionalism and technological transhumanism that a strong Artificial Intelligence (strong-AI) with mental states could be feasible, I analyse the conditions of possibility of mental attribution in first, second and third person perspective between both agents. I conclude that, despite the enormous conceptual debate and the considerable technical difficulties of this undertaking, in case there was a strong-AI with cognitive abilities similar to ours there would be no nomological limits that prevent some kind of bidirectional, asymmetric and gradual mental attribution. |
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| ISSN: | 1889-6855 1989-3787 |