Algebraic fault attack on PRESENT

A new fault analysis method on PRESENT—algebraic fault attack was proposed.This attack combined conventional algebraic cryptanalysis with fault attack,firstly built equivalent Boolean algebraic equations of cipher encryption by algebraic cryptanalysis method; secondly got information of fault crypto...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Ke-hui WU, Xin-jie ZHAO, Tao WANG, Shi-ze GUO, Hui-ying LIU
Format: Article
Language:zho
Published: Editorial Department of Journal on Communications 2012-08-01
Series:Tongxin xuebao
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Online Access:http://www.joconline.com.cn/zh/article/doi/1000-436X(2012)08-0085-08/
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Summary:A new fault analysis method on PRESENT—algebraic fault attack was proposed.This attack combined conventional algebraic cryptanalysis with fault attack,firstly built equivalent Boolean algebraic equations of cipher encryption by algebraic cryptanalysis method; secondly got information of fault cryptograph by fault attack technique,and transformed differential of fault and cryptograph into additional algebraic equations; finally utilized Crypto Mini SAT solver to solve the equations and recover key.Experiments demonstrate that after injecting 4-bit fault to the 29<sup>th</sup> round of PRESENT-80,the fault location and fault value are unknown,only 2 injectings can recover 64-bit last whitening key in 50 seconds that reduce master key of PRESENT-80 searching space to 2<sup>16</sup>,then recover the master key after 1 minute brute-force-search on average; compared with previous fault attack on PRESENT,the amount of this attack sample is the smallest;meanwhile,the analysis method proposed can be applied into the algebraic fault attack of other block ciphers.
ISSN:1000-436X