The function(s) of consciousness: an evolutionary perspective
The functions of consciousness, viewed from an evolutionary standpoint, can be categorized as being either general or particular. There are two general functions, meaning those that do not depend on the particulars of how consciousness influences behavior or how and why it first evolved: of (1) expa...
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Frontiers Media S.A.
2024-11-01
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| Series: | Frontiers in Psychology |
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| Online Access: | https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1493423/full |
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| author | Thurston Lacalli |
| author_facet | Thurston Lacalli |
| author_sort | Thurston Lacalli |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The functions of consciousness, viewed from an evolutionary standpoint, can be categorized as being either general or particular. There are two general functions, meaning those that do not depend on the particulars of how consciousness influences behavior or how and why it first evolved: of (1) expanding the behavioral repertoire of the individual through the gradual accumulation of neurocircuitry innovations incorporating consciousness that would not exist without it, and (2) reducing the time scale over which preprogrammed behaviors can be altered, from evolutionary time, across generations, to real-time. But neither answers Velmans’ question, of why consciousness is adaptive in a proximate sense, and hence why it would have evolved, which depends on identifying the particular function it first performed. Memory arguably plays a role here, as a strong case can be made that consciousness first evolved to make motivational control more responsive, though memory, to the past life experiences of the individual. A control mechanism of this kind could, for example, have evolved to consciously inhibit appetitive behaviors, whether consciously instigated or not, that would otherwise expose the individual to harm. There is then the question of whether, for amniote vertebrates, a role in memory formation and access would have led directly to a wider role for consciousness in the way the brain operates, or if some other explanation is required. Velmans’ question might then have two answers, the second having more to do with the advantages of global oversight for the control of behavior, as in a global workspace, or for conferring meaning on sensory experience in a way that non-conscious neural processes cannot. Meaning in this context refers specifically to the way valence is embodied in the genomic instructions for assembling the neurocircuitry responsible for phenomenal contents, so it constitutes an embodied form of species memory, and a way of thinking about the adaptive utility of consciousness that is less concerned with real-time mechanistic events than with information storage on an evolutionary time scale. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-7ff6f68b06a947b8a74188b6912c4dc0 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1664-1078 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2024-11-01 |
| publisher | Frontiers Media S.A. |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Frontiers in Psychology |
| spelling | doaj-art-7ff6f68b06a947b8a74188b6912c4dc02024-11-26T04:25:57ZengFrontiers Media S.A.Frontiers in Psychology1664-10782024-11-011510.3389/fpsyg.2024.14934231493423The function(s) of consciousness: an evolutionary perspectiveThurston LacalliThe functions of consciousness, viewed from an evolutionary standpoint, can be categorized as being either general or particular. There are two general functions, meaning those that do not depend on the particulars of how consciousness influences behavior or how and why it first evolved: of (1) expanding the behavioral repertoire of the individual through the gradual accumulation of neurocircuitry innovations incorporating consciousness that would not exist without it, and (2) reducing the time scale over which preprogrammed behaviors can be altered, from evolutionary time, across generations, to real-time. But neither answers Velmans’ question, of why consciousness is adaptive in a proximate sense, and hence why it would have evolved, which depends on identifying the particular function it first performed. Memory arguably plays a role here, as a strong case can be made that consciousness first evolved to make motivational control more responsive, though memory, to the past life experiences of the individual. A control mechanism of this kind could, for example, have evolved to consciously inhibit appetitive behaviors, whether consciously instigated or not, that would otherwise expose the individual to harm. There is then the question of whether, for amniote vertebrates, a role in memory formation and access would have led directly to a wider role for consciousness in the way the brain operates, or if some other explanation is required. Velmans’ question might then have two answers, the second having more to do with the advantages of global oversight for the control of behavior, as in a global workspace, or for conferring meaning on sensory experience in a way that non-conscious neural processes cannot. Meaning in this context refers specifically to the way valence is embodied in the genomic instructions for assembling the neurocircuitry responsible for phenomenal contents, so it constitutes an embodied form of species memory, and a way of thinking about the adaptive utility of consciousness that is less concerned with real-time mechanistic events than with information storage on an evolutionary time scale.https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1493423/fullmemory theories of consciousnessagencyphenomenal experiencequaliaspecies memory |
| spellingShingle | Thurston Lacalli The function(s) of consciousness: an evolutionary perspective Frontiers in Psychology memory theories of consciousness agency phenomenal experience qualia species memory |
| title | The function(s) of consciousness: an evolutionary perspective |
| title_full | The function(s) of consciousness: an evolutionary perspective |
| title_fullStr | The function(s) of consciousness: an evolutionary perspective |
| title_full_unstemmed | The function(s) of consciousness: an evolutionary perspective |
| title_short | The function(s) of consciousness: an evolutionary perspective |
| title_sort | function s of consciousness an evolutionary perspective |
| topic | memory theories of consciousness agency phenomenal experience qualia species memory |
| url | https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1493423/full |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT thurstonlacalli thefunctionsofconsciousnessanevolutionaryperspective AT thurstonlacalli functionsofconsciousnessanevolutionaryperspective |