Structural analysis of oligopoly market based on the reflective game model by the example of telecommunication market in Russia
Objective: to analyze the possible structures of the oligopoly market distribution by the example of telecommunication industry in terms of the agents’ reflexive behavior.Methods: game theory, economic-mathematical modeling.Results: the article states that one of the first objects in the game theory...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Tatar Educational Center “Taglimat” Ltd.
2017-12-01
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| Series: | Russian Journal of Economics and Law |
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| Online Access: | https://www.rusjel.ru/jour/article/view/2092 |
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| author | I. A. Biryukova M. I. Geras’kin |
| author_facet | I. A. Biryukova M. I. Geras’kin |
| author_sort | I. A. Biryukova |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Objective: to analyze the possible structures of the oligopoly market distribution by the example of telecommunication industry in terms of the agents’ reflexive behavior.Methods: game theory, economic-mathematical modeling.Results: the article states that one of the first objects in the game theory is an oligopoly market. Based on the analysis of game theory studies, it was found that there is a need to achieve information equilibrium in reflexive games of three agents in the oligopoly market. To solve this problem, we analyzed all possible representations of the agents, leading to the set of games in the Russian telecommunications market for three agents: OJSC “MTS”, OJSC “Megafon” and OJSC “Vympelcom”. Three reflection grades were studied: 1) representations of the agent about other agents, 2) representations of the agent’s perception of other agents about it and 3) representations of the agent about what its competitors think about the first agent’s opinion about the other two. As a result, the general patterns were revealed of the expressions of conjectural variations in each case; it was proved that further detailing of the reflection is not needed.As a result of calculations, the models of informational equilibriums of the Russian telecommunication market were constructed; for that, the averaged values of the demand and cost functions parameters functions of cellular communication operators were taken. It was also revealed that in 2015 the actual telecommunication market in the Russian Federation qualitatively, i.e. by the ratio of market shares, was close to equilibrium on condition of first rank reflexive behavior for the case when the market leader, OJSC “MTS”, represents its counterparties - OJSC “Megafon” and OJSC “Vympelcom” - as the driven agents. Scientific novelty: the analytical expressions for the information equilibrium parameters (issues and profits of the agents, aggregate output and prices) are obtained in the oligopoly market with a linear demand function, linear cost functions of agents with equal marginal and fixed costs, for arbitrary reflection grades.Practical significance: the obtained set of informational equilibriums may be used to compare it to the actual equilibriums of the Russian telecommunications market to assess the reflection grades of its agents. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-5f67d8abcfc143c49bbfe9bca61b1d14 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 2782-2923 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2017-12-01 |
| publisher | Tatar Educational Center “Taglimat” Ltd. |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Russian Journal of Economics and Law |
| spelling | doaj-art-5f67d8abcfc143c49bbfe9bca61b1d142024-12-18T11:47:03ZengTatar Educational Center “Taglimat” Ltd.Russian Journal of Economics and Law2782-29232017-12-01114668110.21202/1993-047X.11.2017.4.66-812090Structural analysis of oligopoly market based on the reflective game model by the example of telecommunication market in RussiaI. A. Biryukova0M. I. Geras’kin1Samara National Research University named after Acad. S. P. Korolev (Samara University)Samara National Research University named after Acad. S. P. Korolev (Samara University)Objective: to analyze the possible structures of the oligopoly market distribution by the example of telecommunication industry in terms of the agents’ reflexive behavior.Methods: game theory, economic-mathematical modeling.Results: the article states that one of the first objects in the game theory is an oligopoly market. Based on the analysis of game theory studies, it was found that there is a need to achieve information equilibrium in reflexive games of three agents in the oligopoly market. To solve this problem, we analyzed all possible representations of the agents, leading to the set of games in the Russian telecommunications market for three agents: OJSC “MTS”, OJSC “Megafon” and OJSC “Vympelcom”. Three reflection grades were studied: 1) representations of the agent about other agents, 2) representations of the agent’s perception of other agents about it and 3) representations of the agent about what its competitors think about the first agent’s opinion about the other two. As a result, the general patterns were revealed of the expressions of conjectural variations in each case; it was proved that further detailing of the reflection is not needed.As a result of calculations, the models of informational equilibriums of the Russian telecommunication market were constructed; for that, the averaged values of the demand and cost functions parameters functions of cellular communication operators were taken. It was also revealed that in 2015 the actual telecommunication market in the Russian Federation qualitatively, i.e. by the ratio of market shares, was close to equilibrium on condition of first rank reflexive behavior for the case when the market leader, OJSC “MTS”, represents its counterparties - OJSC “Megafon” and OJSC “Vympelcom” - as the driven agents. Scientific novelty: the analytical expressions for the information equilibrium parameters (issues and profits of the agents, aggregate output and prices) are obtained in the oligopoly market with a linear demand function, linear cost functions of agents with equal marginal and fixed costs, for arbitrary reflection grades.Practical significance: the obtained set of informational equilibriums may be used to compare it to the actual equilibriums of the Russian telecommunications market to assess the reflection grades of its agents.https://www.rusjel.ru/jour/article/view/2092экономика и управление народным хозяйствомрефлексиярангрефлексивная играагентравновесие по штакельбергуолигополияпредположительная вариациятелекоммуникационный рынок |
| spellingShingle | I. A. Biryukova M. I. Geras’kin Structural analysis of oligopoly market based on the reflective game model by the example of telecommunication market in Russia Russian Journal of Economics and Law экономика и управление народным хозяйством рефлексия ранг рефлексивная игра агент равновесие по штакельбергу олигополия предположительная вариация телекоммуникационный рынок |
| title | Structural analysis of oligopoly market based on the reflective game model by the example of telecommunication market in Russia |
| title_full | Structural analysis of oligopoly market based on the reflective game model by the example of telecommunication market in Russia |
| title_fullStr | Structural analysis of oligopoly market based on the reflective game model by the example of telecommunication market in Russia |
| title_full_unstemmed | Structural analysis of oligopoly market based on the reflective game model by the example of telecommunication market in Russia |
| title_short | Structural analysis of oligopoly market based on the reflective game model by the example of telecommunication market in Russia |
| title_sort | structural analysis of oligopoly market based on the reflective game model by the example of telecommunication market in russia |
| topic | экономика и управление народным хозяйством рефлексия ранг рефлексивная игра агент равновесие по штакельбергу олигополия предположительная вариация телекоммуникационный рынок |
| url | https://www.rusjel.ru/jour/article/view/2092 |
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