Collusion-resistant cross-chain transaction scheme based on game theory and verifiable consensus
Existing cross-chain transaction solutions often overlook the issue of cross-chain collusion. In response, the counter-collusion cross-channel was proposed to facilitate scalable and collusion-resistant cross-chain transactions. Firstly, a strategy for establishing multiple-relay channels was introd...
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | zho |
| Published: |
Editorial Department of Journal on Communications
2024-11-01
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| Series: | Tongxin xuebao |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www.joconline.com.cn/zh/article/doi/10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2024202/ |
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| Summary: | Existing cross-chain transaction solutions often overlook the issue of cross-chain collusion. In response, the counter-collusion cross-channel was proposed to facilitate scalable and collusion-resistant cross-chain transactions. Firstly, a strategy for establishing multiple-relay channels was introduced, including relay chain observers. These channels serve as off-chain pathways connecting users from different business chains, thereby facilitating private and scalable cross-chain transactions. Secondly, a collusion-resistant cross-chain transaction protocol based on game-theoretic incentives was designed, stimulating distrust among colluders to deter cross-chain collusion and uphold transaction security. Thirdly, a layered verifiable cross-chain consensus method was proposed, relying on channel state proofs to ensure secure cross-chain settlement. Formal analyses of participant game dynamics demonstrate that non-collusion emerges as the dominant strategy for channel users under reasonable assumptions. Experimental results indicate that the proposed scheme effectively prevents cross-chain collusion while achieving high cross-chain throughput and scalability compared to traditional relay-based cross-chain solutions. |
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| ISSN: | 1000-436X |