The Evidence-Based Argument in Peer Disagreement
The problem of disagreement is one of the most important issues that have been debated in epistemology in recent years, and in particular the peer disagreement. The main question of this problem is what kind of attitude we should rationally adopt when we realize that someone...
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Motif Yayıncılık
2021-12-01
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| Series: | Dini Araştırmalar |
| Online Access: | https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/doi/10.15745/da.990404 |
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| author | Elif Kütükcü |
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| author_sort | Elif Kütükcü |
| collection | DOAJ |
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The problem of disagreement is one of the most important issues that have been debated in epistemology in recent years, and in particular the peer disagreement. The main question of this problem is what kind of attitude we should rationally adopt when we realize that someone who is an epistemic peer to us does not think the same. There are four main responses to this question: conciliationism, steadfastness, total evidence view, and justificationist view. According to conciliationism, when there is a peer disagreement, the parties should give equal weight to each other's beliefs, lower their confidence in their own beliefs or suspend their judgments on the issue in question. According to the steadfastness view, when there is a peer disagreement, one can continue to maintain one's own belief, and this is rational. In the total evidence view, one's total evidence in disagreement with an epistemic peer; consists of his own belief, the belief of his peer, and the evidence on which their belief before the disagreement is based. For this reason, according to Kelly, who is the owner of this view, it may be reasonable to place more weight on one's own belief if the original evidence supports his belief more than that of the peer. According to the justificationist view, the degree of your prior justification for the proposition in disagreement determines your response to it; namely, if you have a high degree prior justification you can maintain your belief as in the steadfastness view, but if you do not have a high degree prior justification, you need to revise your belief as in the equal weight view. In this article, first I will briefly examine these four views and deal with the points where they fail to satisfy. Later, I will argue that resolution of the disagreement should be case-based. And finally, I will present the evidence-based argument in peer disagreement which is my own response to this problem and explain it with sample cases. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-4705021b253349a1a531e8a6f89ea138 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1301-966X |
| language | Arabic |
| publishDate | 2021-12-01 |
| publisher | Motif Yayıncılık |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Dini Araştırmalar |
| spelling | doaj-art-4705021b253349a1a531e8a6f89ea1382025-01-12T07:48:50ZaraMotif YayıncılıkDini Araştırmalar1301-966X2021-12-01246128129610.15745/da.990404 The Evidence-Based Argument in Peer Disagreement Elif Kütükcü0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6189-2095ANKARA SOSYAL BİLİMLER ÜNİVERSİTESİ, İSLAMİ İLİMLER FAKÜLTESİ, FELSEFE VE DİN BİLİMLERİ BÖLÜMÜ, DİN FELSEFESİ ANABİLİM DALI The problem of disagreement is one of the most important issues that have been debated in epistemology in recent years, and in particular the peer disagreement. The main question of this problem is what kind of attitude we should rationally adopt when we realize that someone who is an epistemic peer to us does not think the same. There are four main responses to this question: conciliationism, steadfastness, total evidence view, and justificationist view. According to conciliationism, when there is a peer disagreement, the parties should give equal weight to each other's beliefs, lower their confidence in their own beliefs or suspend their judgments on the issue in question. According to the steadfastness view, when there is a peer disagreement, one can continue to maintain one's own belief, and this is rational. In the total evidence view, one's total evidence in disagreement with an epistemic peer; consists of his own belief, the belief of his peer, and the evidence on which their belief before the disagreement is based. For this reason, according to Kelly, who is the owner of this view, it may be reasonable to place more weight on one's own belief if the original evidence supports his belief more than that of the peer. According to the justificationist view, the degree of your prior justification for the proposition in disagreement determines your response to it; namely, if you have a high degree prior justification you can maintain your belief as in the steadfastness view, but if you do not have a high degree prior justification, you need to revise your belief as in the equal weight view. In this article, first I will briefly examine these four views and deal with the points where they fail to satisfy. Later, I will argue that resolution of the disagreement should be case-based. And finally, I will present the evidence-based argument in peer disagreement which is my own response to this problem and explain it with sample cases.https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/doi/10.15745/da.990404 |
| spellingShingle | Elif Kütükcü The Evidence-Based Argument in Peer Disagreement Dini Araştırmalar |
| title |
The Evidence-Based Argument in Peer Disagreement
|
| title_full |
The Evidence-Based Argument in Peer Disagreement
|
| title_fullStr |
The Evidence-Based Argument in Peer Disagreement
|
| title_full_unstemmed |
The Evidence-Based Argument in Peer Disagreement
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| title_short |
The Evidence-Based Argument in Peer Disagreement
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| title_sort | evidence based argument in peer disagreement |
| url | https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/doi/10.15745/da.990404 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT elifkutukcu theevidencebasedargumentinpeerdisagreement AT elifkutukcu evidencebasedargumentinpeerdisagreement |