The timing of environmental policy in a duopolistic market
In this paper the strategic use of innovation by two polluting firms to influence environmental policy is evaluated. The analysis is carried out by comparing two alternative policy regimes for two policy instruments: Taxes and standards. The first of the regimes assumes that the regulator commits to...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Universitat Politècnica de València
2015-06-01
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| Series: | Economía Agraria y Recursos Naturales |
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| Online Access: | https://polipapers.upv.es/index.php/EARN/article/view/4822 |
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| author | Rafael Moner-Colonques Santiago Rubio |
| author_facet | Rafael Moner-Colonques Santiago Rubio |
| author_sort | Rafael Moner-Colonques |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In this paper the strategic use of innovation by two polluting firms to influence environmental policy is evaluated. The analysis is carried out by comparing two alternative policy regimes for two policy instruments: Taxes and standards. The first of the regimes assumes that the regulator commits to an ex-ante level of the policy instrument. In the second one, there is no commitment. The results show that when there is no commitment and a tax is used to control emissions, the strategic behavior of firms can be welfare improving if the efficiency of the clean technology is relatively low. If this is not the case, the strategic behavior of the duopolists has a detrimental effect on welfare regardless of the policy instrument used to control emissions. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-2f18d90d25604c6292e4f272c63822c8 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1578-0732 2174-7350 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2015-06-01 |
| publisher | Universitat Politècnica de València |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Economía Agraria y Recursos Naturales |
| spelling | doaj-art-2f18d90d25604c6292e4f272c63822c82024-12-02T04:38:50ZengUniversitat Politècnica de ValènciaEconomía Agraria y Recursos Naturales1578-07322174-73502015-06-01151114010.7201/earn.2015.01.023080The timing of environmental policy in a duopolistic marketRafael Moner-Colonques0Santiago Rubio1Universitat de ValènciaUniversitat de ValènciaIn this paper the strategic use of innovation by two polluting firms to influence environmental policy is evaluated. The analysis is carried out by comparing two alternative policy regimes for two policy instruments: Taxes and standards. The first of the regimes assumes that the regulator commits to an ex-ante level of the policy instrument. In the second one, there is no commitment. The results show that when there is no commitment and a tax is used to control emissions, the strategic behavior of firms can be welfare improving if the efficiency of the clean technology is relatively low. If this is not the case, the strategic behavior of the duopolists has a detrimental effect on welfare regardless of the policy instrument used to control emissions.https://polipapers.upv.es/index.php/EARN/article/view/4822commitmentduopolyinnovationstandardstaxes. |
| spellingShingle | Rafael Moner-Colonques Santiago Rubio The timing of environmental policy in a duopolistic market Economía Agraria y Recursos Naturales commitment duopoly innovation standards taxes. |
| title | The timing of environmental policy in a duopolistic market |
| title_full | The timing of environmental policy in a duopolistic market |
| title_fullStr | The timing of environmental policy in a duopolistic market |
| title_full_unstemmed | The timing of environmental policy in a duopolistic market |
| title_short | The timing of environmental policy in a duopolistic market |
| title_sort | timing of environmental policy in a duopolistic market |
| topic | commitment duopoly innovation standards taxes. |
| url | https://polipapers.upv.es/index.php/EARN/article/view/4822 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT rafaelmonercolonques thetimingofenvironmentalpolicyinaduopolisticmarket AT santiagorubio thetimingofenvironmentalpolicyinaduopolisticmarket AT rafaelmonercolonques timingofenvironmentalpolicyinaduopolisticmarket AT santiagorubio timingofenvironmentalpolicyinaduopolisticmarket |