Challenges and impasses in Kant’s theory of truth and judgment: An interpretation of Kant’s anti-Realism
This article has three objectives. The first is to show the inevitable ambiguity between realism and idealism in Kant’s work. The second is to show the nature of Kantian realism as his response to the skeptic and a reflection on the objective distinctness of representations. The version of empir...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Editorial Universidad Adventista del Plata
2024-12-01
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| Series: | Enfoques |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://publicaciones.uap.edu.ar/index.php/revistaenfoques/article/view/1191 |
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| Summary: | This article has three objectives. The first is to show the inevitable ambiguity between
realism and idealism in Kant’s work. The second is to show the nature of Kantian
realism as his response to the skeptic and a reflection on the objective distinctness
of representations. The version of empirical reality proposed as the answer to the
skeptic, however, has overt elements of anti-reality: it is built in the tension between
the idea of proof and the idea of truth. Kant employs the theory of apperception
and judgment, which functions by generating pure conceptual parameters (categories) to address this tension. The manner in which Kant’s theory of apperception and
judgment offers solutions to the challenge of aligning truth and proof is in line with
epistemic, anti-realistic, anti-metaphysical, and non-classical approaches to logical
representation (which aligns with Kant’s transcendental logic). Lastly, we will present an overview of the discourse surrounding the nature of Kantian empirical realism
and compare it to the version of “reality” advocated by metaphysical perspectives,
empirical science, and common sense.
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| ISSN: | 1514-6006 1669-2721 |