Two-Valued Strongly Group Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions

We present simple and direct arguments to characterize strongly group strategy-proof social choice functions whose range is of cardinality two. The underlying society is of arbitrary cardinality, and agents can be indifferent among alternatives.

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Main Authors: Anna De Simone, K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2024-12-01
Series:Games
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/15/6/44
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author Anna De Simone
K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao
author_facet Anna De Simone
K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao
author_sort Anna De Simone
collection DOAJ
description We present simple and direct arguments to characterize strongly group strategy-proof social choice functions whose range is of cardinality two. The underlying society is of arbitrary cardinality, and agents can be indifferent among alternatives.
format Article
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institution Kabale University
issn 2073-4336
language English
publishDate 2024-12-01
publisher MDPI AG
record_format Article
series Games
spelling doaj-art-247e347a699f4c9c88e7d362b1cda5b82024-12-27T14:27:39ZengMDPI AGGames2073-43362024-12-011564410.3390/g15060044Two-Valued Strongly Group Strategy-Proof Social Choice FunctionsAnna De Simone0K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao1Dipartimento di Matematica e Applicazioni R. Caccioppoli, Università Federico II di Napoli, 80126 Napoli, ItalyDepartment of Computer Information Systems, Indiana University Northwest, Gary, IN 46408, USAWe present simple and direct arguments to characterize strongly group strategy-proof social choice functions whose range is of cardinality two. The underlying society is of arbitrary cardinality, and agents can be indifferent among alternatives.https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/15/6/44social choice functionsweak preferencesweak manipulabilityveto ruleserial dictator
spellingShingle Anna De Simone
K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao
Two-Valued Strongly Group Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions
Games
social choice functions
weak preferences
weak manipulability
veto rule
serial dictator
title Two-Valued Strongly Group Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions
title_full Two-Valued Strongly Group Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions
title_fullStr Two-Valued Strongly Group Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions
title_full_unstemmed Two-Valued Strongly Group Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions
title_short Two-Valued Strongly Group Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions
title_sort two valued strongly group strategy proof social choice functions
topic social choice functions
weak preferences
weak manipulability
veto rule
serial dictator
url https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/15/6/44
work_keys_str_mv AT annadesimone twovaluedstronglygroupstrategyproofsocialchoicefunctions
AT kpsbhaskararao twovaluedstronglygroupstrategyproofsocialchoicefunctions