Evolutionary game model of information management mechanism for public opinion governance

Conflicting information in online social networks, often stemming from opposing views, can lead to rumors and the fragmentation of society.A reputation-based dynamic information management mechanism was proposed, adopting a dynamic reward and punishment strategy to decrease unnecessary information c...

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Main Authors: Shuting LIU, Yinghua MA, Xiuzhen CHEN
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: POSTS&TELECOM PRESS Co., LTD 2023-12-01
Series:网络与信息安全学报
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.cjnis.com.cn/thesisDetails#10.11959/j.issn.2096-109x.2023086
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author Shuting LIU
Yinghua MA
Xiuzhen CHEN
author_facet Shuting LIU
Yinghua MA
Xiuzhen CHEN
author_sort Shuting LIU
collection DOAJ
description Conflicting information in online social networks, often stemming from opposing views, can lead to rumors and the fragmentation of society.A reputation-based dynamic information management mechanism was proposed, adopting a dynamic reward and punishment strategy to decrease unnecessary information conflict so as to activate self-purification of network.By utilizing evolutionary game theory, a cumulative-prospect-based evolutionary game model of social network information conflict was constructed to validate the efficacy of the proposed mechanism.Numerical simulations were conducted to analyze the evolutionary trends of 18 different theoretical application scenarios under 9 constraints.The results demonstrate that, under constraint 5, both sides of the game tend to exhibit relatively rational behavior towards conflicts.Furthermore, dynamic evolution analysis and sensitivity analysis of the model parameters were performed while satisfying constraint 5, providing practical strategic suggestions for the dynamic information management mechanism.This model represents a novel attempt to capture the interaction of multiple factors, such as interest-driven behavior and conformity psychology, in the evolution of public opinion.Moreover, the model successfully simulates well-known patterns of rumor dissemination, confirming its validity.The proposed model offers valuable insights for the development and design of malicious information control systems in social networks and provides new ideas for the research and implementation of public opinion governance.
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institution Kabale University
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series 网络与信息安全学报
spelling doaj-art-1dcaf780cba843708977f3ce7141ba6d2025-01-15T03:16:53ZengPOSTS&TELECOM PRESS Co., LTD网络与信息安全学报2096-109X2023-12-01910211559580546Evolutionary game model of information management mechanism for public opinion governanceShuting LIUYinghua MAXiuzhen CHENConflicting information in online social networks, often stemming from opposing views, can lead to rumors and the fragmentation of society.A reputation-based dynamic information management mechanism was proposed, adopting a dynamic reward and punishment strategy to decrease unnecessary information conflict so as to activate self-purification of network.By utilizing evolutionary game theory, a cumulative-prospect-based evolutionary game model of social network information conflict was constructed to validate the efficacy of the proposed mechanism.Numerical simulations were conducted to analyze the evolutionary trends of 18 different theoretical application scenarios under 9 constraints.The results demonstrate that, under constraint 5, both sides of the game tend to exhibit relatively rational behavior towards conflicts.Furthermore, dynamic evolution analysis and sensitivity analysis of the model parameters were performed while satisfying constraint 5, providing practical strategic suggestions for the dynamic information management mechanism.This model represents a novel attempt to capture the interaction of multiple factors, such as interest-driven behavior and conformity psychology, in the evolution of public opinion.Moreover, the model successfully simulates well-known patterns of rumor dissemination, confirming its validity.The proposed model offers valuable insights for the development and design of malicious information control systems in social networks and provides new ideas for the research and implementation of public opinion governance.http://www.cjnis.com.cn/thesisDetails#10.11959/j.issn.2096-109x.2023086evolutionary gameinformation managementreputationsocial networkpublic opinion governance
spellingShingle Shuting LIU
Yinghua MA
Xiuzhen CHEN
Evolutionary game model of information management mechanism for public opinion governance
网络与信息安全学报
evolutionary game
information management
reputation
social network
public opinion governance
title Evolutionary game model of information management mechanism for public opinion governance
title_full Evolutionary game model of information management mechanism for public opinion governance
title_fullStr Evolutionary game model of information management mechanism for public opinion governance
title_full_unstemmed Evolutionary game model of information management mechanism for public opinion governance
title_short Evolutionary game model of information management mechanism for public opinion governance
title_sort evolutionary game model of information management mechanism for public opinion governance
topic evolutionary game
information management
reputation
social network
public opinion governance
url http://www.cjnis.com.cn/thesisDetails#10.11959/j.issn.2096-109x.2023086
work_keys_str_mv AT shutingliu evolutionarygamemodelofinformationmanagementmechanismforpublicopiniongovernance
AT yinghuama evolutionarygamemodelofinformationmanagementmechanismforpublicopiniongovernance
AT xiuzhenchen evolutionarygamemodelofinformationmanagementmechanismforpublicopiniongovernance