A Critique of Metaethical Constructivism
Metaethical constructivism, proposed by Sharon Street, has been described as a novel and promising metaethical theory. It is a form of cognitivist anti-realism that purports to be without substantive normative assumptions, while still allowing for the possibility of an agent being mistaken about wha...
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Masaryk University
2025-06-01
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| Series: | Profil |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://journals.phil.muni.cz/profil/article/view/40528/34124 |
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| Summary: | Metaethical constructivism, proposed by Sharon Street, has been described as a novel and promising metaethical theory. It is a form of cognitivist anti-realism that purports to be without substantive normative assumptions, while still allowing for the possibility of an agent being mistaken about what is normatively true for them. Here, I present five objections to the theory’s purported strengths. I argue primarily that metaethical constructivism cannot do without substantive normative assumptions, that it is not a novel position in metaethics but a kind of relativism, and that the possibility of an agent being mistaken about what is normatively true for them is more limited than it might seem. I also argue that constructivism does not allow us to evaluate distant pasts and futures, and that it blurs the line between normative truth and falsity. |
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| ISSN: | 1212-9097 |