Channels Coordination Game Model Based on Result Fairness Preference and Reciprocal Fairness Preference: A Behavior Game Forecasting and Analysis Method
In a distribution channel, channel members are not always self-interested, but altruistic in some conditions. Based on this assumption, this paper adopts a behavior game method to analyze and forecast channel members’ decision behavior based on result fairness preference and reciprocal fairness pref...
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Wiley
2014-01-01
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| Series: | Journal of Applied Mathematics |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/321958 |
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| Summary: | In a distribution channel, channel members are not always self-interested, but altruistic in some conditions. Based on this assumption, this paper adopts a behavior game method to analyze
and forecast channel members’ decision behavior based on result fairness preference and reciprocal fairness preference by embedding a fair preference theory in channel research of coordination. The behavior game forecasts that a channel can achieve coordination if channel members consider behavior elements. Using the behavior game theory model we established, we can prove that if retailers only consider the result fairness
preference and they are not jealous of manufacturers’ benefit, manufacturers will be more friendly to retailers. In such case, the total utility of the channel is higher compared with that of self-interest channel, and the utility of channel members is Pareto improved. If both manufactures and retailers consider reciprocal fairness preference, the manufacturers will give a lower wholesale price to the retailers. In return, the retailers will also reduce retail prices. Therefore, the total utility of the channels will not be less than the total utility of the channel coordination, as long as the reciprocity wholesale prices meet certain conditions. |
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| ISSN: | 1110-757X 1687-0042 |